SELF-ASSERTION IN THE THIRD WORLD

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Ideologies constitute the most relevant political form through which the upheavals of ideas related to political emancipation have been expressed in the third world. These ideologies vary widely in character and have, historically, served very different purposes. Despite this variety, third world ideologies all perform the basic function of third world self-assertion. Usually this goal is stated in universalist terms; however, the real unit of self-assertion is almost invariably the state. Externally, the self-assertive nature of these ideologies may support a rigidly independent stand in international affairs, political and economic independence, equality, and respect among nations. Internally, they contribute to unity and the modernization of social norms. They will grow more complex, mature, and domestic in the coming decades and a greater role will be played by ideologies with strong worker affiliations. The fact that third world countries have begun to export ideologies foreshadows an age of true world integration, interpenetration, and interdependence in the realm of social and political ideas.

The so-called "world periphery" has been in recent times the scene of one of the most radical and far-reaching transformations of the world community. About two-thirds of the world population, organized into more than a hundred politically independent states, have become recognized and legally equal members of the international community.

The process of political emancipation of the third world, sometimes called "anticolonial" or "anticolonialist" revolution, has been usually preceded, accompanied, and/or followed by upheavals in the realm of social and political ideas, thoughts, outlooks, and creeds. It is important to inquire into this dimension if we are to understand the continuing process of reshaping the world order. These developments complement profound institutional, legal, economic, military, and other shifts on the world scene.

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have been expressed in the third world. Other forms (religion, visual arts, literature, music, and such) become important only to the extent and when associated with or incorporated into living ideologies.

In this article I use the term "the third world" to designate over a hundred countries, mostly in Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania, which: (1) as a rule are not industrially developed; (2) at least psychologically and politically, if not in fact economically, belong to the poor two-thirds of the world population; and (3) still have a fairly fresh and politically relevant memory of domination by former imperial powers (mostly from Europe, the United States and Japan).

These countries could only conditionally be treated as a single group since they differ greatly on many salient indicators: size, resources, length of continuous indigenous statehood, age of political independence, level of social and economic development and wealth, social and political order, and so on. "The third world" seems to be the least objectionable designation among those used in the literature (new, newly liberated, newly independent, underdeveloped, less economically developed, developing, poor, and so on). This designation is also useful for the narrower purpose of this article.

To avoid disputes over the concept of ideology, I will use one of the simplest definitions found in the literature: "Ideology (is) a set of ideas, beliefs and attitudes characteristic of a (social) group" (Plamenatz, 1970). One of its greatest advantages is the relative easiness of operationalization and classification (a set of ideas—social group). I distinguish ideologies from other "patterns of cognitive and moral beliefs about man, society and universe" (Shils, 1968) by a higher level of intellectual sophistication, explicitness, coherence, and integration around core values.

Thus, conceived ideologies are modern by definition, irrespective of the use (disuse or misuse) made of "traditional" (often understood as non-Western) values and symbols. Due to high threshold requirements, ideologies are not present everywhere in the third world, although they have proved to be an important instrument for state, nation, and group self-preservation.

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A great majority of the third world ideologies echo, in one way or another, the wave of political emancipation of the "world periphery." But not all of the them are anticolonialist by their external credo and still fewer are internally revolutionary in character. For these reasons one cannot properly call them "ideologies of the anticolonialist revolution" as some authors do.

It should be noted that the external dimension of the third world ideologies is less than perfectly correlated with their internal dimension. On one hand, movements, parties, and regimes preaching a radical transformation of their respective societies quite often accept or tolerate the perpetuation or a mere switchover in economic, financial, cultural, military, and even visible political dependence on external powers. On the other hand, movements and regimes advocating conservative domestic social and political programs may more virulently and forcefully than "leftists" display the pride of independent statehood. Iman Khomeini and other ideologists of the "Islamic revolution" in Iran have made this point all too well.

The third world today displays a greater variety of ideologies than the "first" world and by far than the "second" world. Within the third world, ideologies developed in the Americas approximate the most closely, and often simply followed developments in Southern and Western Europe and in the United States. Judging by ideological concepts and symbols used, American countries of the third world have been the least original.

Asia and Africa have been more original in this respect, with Asian countries having a substantial advantage over African countries as far as the complexity and maturity of living ideologies were concerned.

Quantitatively the third world countries fall into three groups: zero-ideology states, single ideology states (with only one legal ideology), and multiideology states. This classification should not be confused with a classification of political regimes based on the number of legal political parties.

On the quality side there are obvious great differences among the third world ideologies on such variables as indigenousness, intellectual (including philosophic) sophistication, maturity, co-

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herence, and complexity. As elsewhere, most ideologies of the third world are only partial guides for social behavior, with broadly varying ambitions to achieve universality.

The present great variety of the third world ideologies is a product of complex interplay between multiple domestic social and political factors, external stimuli, and ready-made exports in the realm of ideas. Historically the results of this interplay could be analyzed as layers left behind by ideological currents and operationally as built-in elements of today's ideologies.

The historical layers reflect the stages of political emancipation and the relative weight of most important social groups. Given a rough correspondence between the time of appearance, the social origin of main "ideological primary groups," and the prevalent external influences, I propose to classify the historical layers by refering to three main periods in ideology building of the third world. The historical milestones dividing this century into three main periods are the two world wars.

The earliest stage of ideology building (prior to World War I) was dominated in the third world by educated members of "Westernized" elites. Although individuals from the upper peasantry and lower levels of bureaucracy were among the purveyors of ideologies, this period could best be characterized as bourgeois (by predominant social character) and moderately liberal by political coloration. (N.B. I use European ideological labels as a rough yardstick for comparative purposes only, without necessarily implying blind and unintelligent emulation of metropolitan fashions.) Sun Yat-Sen's three points of 1905 (in translation: nationalism, people's rule, people's welfare) have shown an apt adaptation of Western European liberal bourgeois ideas to the Chinese environment. The slogans of political equality, constitutionalism, political liberties, and so on were used by ideologies of that period in India, China, Turkey, Egypt, and Mexico in order (1) to undermine the legitimacy of external domination and (2) to remove some obstacles in the way of economic and social development.

The second stage of ideology building (between the two world wars) was characterized by geographic expansion to numerous

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Asian countries (except into the least developed and most isolated, e.g., Afghanistan) and to the most socially developed and "Westernized" African colonies (e.g., Gold Coast Ghana and Senegal). We also witnessed a considerable widening of the social base from which primary ideological groups spring. The stage was dominated by the indigenous middle and petty bourgeoisie, which embraced social reformist ideas of statism, social welfare, and solidarity. On the other hand, serious attempts were made to amalgamate "traditional" values and symbols with select "Western" ideas and organizational techniques (Gandhism, RSS-Jang Sangh, Ahmaddiyah in India and future Pakistan, "Muslim Brethren" in the Arab Near East, and so on). The social base of emerging ideologies widened to include parts of the peasantry, city lumpenproletariat, and agricultural and industrial workers.

Among ideological influences one should note two important currents emanating from within the third world—Ataturkism and Gandhism. Among influences from without, the most salient proved to be the implantation of Marxism and the echo of the Russian revolution in the eastern half of Asia. Today we tend to underestimate the erstwhile influences by German, Italian, and Japanese totalitarian ideologies on "nationalist" movements and leaders among Arabs ("Free Officers" and "Muslim Brethren" in Egypt), in Indonesia (Sukarno), Burma (Aung San), Argentina (Peron), and others. More durable, if rather weak have been the influence of European social democracy (and marginally, of Trotskyism).

The third period (post-World War II) witnessed the greatest geographic push (reflecting the disintegration of classical colonialism), the further widening of the social base, and the numerical predominance assumed by ideologies of socialist coloration (if not orientation). Interacting with older layers, ideologies formed in this period either displaced the former or created with them various amalgams. Present-day Iran furnishes one of the most striking current examples of a fusion between traditionalist (and even retrograde) social norms and modernity. R. Khomeini and other ideologists of the "Islamic revolution" aptly utilize Shiit religious symbols as modern mass mobilization (and manipula-

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tion) devices. Curious combinations of "traditionalism" (including religious traditionalism), bourgeois liberalism, social reformism, welfarism, and Marxism are well documented in the studies on Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party (Ghana), Keita and the "Union Soudanaise" (Mali), Nyerere and TANU (Tanzania), Nehru and the Indian Congress, U Nu, Sukarno, Nasser, Bourghiba, and others. Mao Ze-don has explicitly acknowledged the imprint on his own political maturation left by the traditional (Confucian) Chinese historiography, by Napoleon, Sun Yat-Sen, and later by Marx. These amalgams justify characterizing many third world ideologies as eclectic. In Moammar El Kadhafi's "Greenbook" (Lybia) one finds concepts and building blocks from the heritage of Islamic fundamentalism, but also from Rousseau, Mill, Proudhon, and Marx.

In social terms this period is dominated by petty bourgeois and peasant ideologies, embraced and developed mostly by intellectuals of humble social origin. The great attraction of socialism in this period can be explained by at least four factors: (1) underpinning the delegitimation of (capitalist) colonialism and imperialism; (2) the correspondence with egalitarian ethos espoused by most mass political movements; (3) the perceived correspondence with the requirements of economic development; and (4) by example and political influence of the "second world" countries governed by Marxist parties, by economic and military aid given by these countries.

Apart from the quantitative and qualitative changes after World War II one notes a visible transformation in the main function of ideologies. Earlier they mostly served the purpose of delegitimation of the previous social and political order. With political emancipation attained and political power wrested from the colonial authorities or traditional oligarchy, the main function of ideology has changed into: (1) legitimizing the new social and political order and (2) reshaping prevailing social norms. The latter is to be achieved either by implanting social norms of a "new society" or by reestablishing the norms of the "golden past" (and by eliminating corrupt foreign, usually Western social norms).

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It is incorrect to call the third world ideologies "nationalist," despite the fact that some third world ideologists so described the most visible part of their credo. The actual nature of the great majority of the third world ideologies does not correspond either to the original meaning of *"la Nation"* as proclaimed by the French Revolution or to the pejorative meaning of "nationalism" in the European late 19th and early 20th centuries. By the frame of reference used we can divide the third world ideologies into those advocating emancipation: (1) of a substate unit (ethnic, religious, or cultural group); (2) of a unit corresponding territorially to the "traditional" indigenous (usually multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious) state or to a unit of colonial administration bearing no relation to precolonial indigenous states; (3) of a suprastate unit (continent—Pan-Africanism; region, cultural community—Pan-Arabism; religion—Pan-Islamism; race—"Negritude"; class—Marxian "proletarian internationalism"). A great majority of the third world ideologies belong to the second group, while the phenomena corresponding to chauvinism and xenophobia, trademarks of the European notion of nationalism, are usually found in the third world at the substate level.

Instead of the existing classifications of the third world ideologies (left-right, revolutionary-reactionary, radical-moderate, mobilization-consensus, soft-hard, and such), I use as a heuristic device a multidimensional matrix:

Dimensions:

A. Core values
   1. Traditionalist (religious, secular, mixed)
   2. Liberal
   3. Indigenized socialist
   4. Marxist
   5. Other

B. Social (class) affiliation
   (bourgeois, feudal, peasant; lumpenproletariat, worker)

C. Frame of reference
   (substate, state, suprastate)

D. Strategy of social change (revolutionary, reformist, conservative)

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E. Methods of goal attainment (coercive, consensual)

F. Political regime sought or established (democratic, authoritarian)

Using this matrix we can, for example, classify the ideologies existing in 1979 within the victorious Sandinista movement in Nicaragua:

(1) The Prolonged Popular War (GPP)—between indigenized socialist and Marxist; petty bourgeois; moderate revolutionary; consensual; democratic
(2) The Proletarios—Marxist; peasant; worker; radical revolutionary; coercive; authoritarian
(3) The Terceristas (Third Force)—the largest coalition group, containing proponents of liberal, socialist, and Marxist values; social coalition from bourgeoisie to peasantry; reformist to revolutionary; consensual; democratic.

Excluding the smallest and least developed countries, most third world states do in fact have one or more ideologies. Ideologies are legally (temporarily) prohibited from public use by those military regimes which pretend to be apolitical and nonideological. But even under such military regimes, ideologies are often and rightly considered an indispensable tool of social, political, and economic development. Many regimes view the official ideology as a symbol of independent statehood, similar to the flag, anthem, army, and state airline.

To hastily fill the perceived void, numerous third world countries have employed one of the two or a combination of two methods: (1) accelerated development of a home-grown ideology financed from state funds and often directed by a ministry for national guidance and (2) outright importation of foreign ideology, sometimes as a part of technical assistance programs.

It is remarkable how quickly symbols and the entire phraseology of a hitherto alien and largely unknown ideology can be assimilated and put into political use. For example, Marxist phraseology was adopted by radical members of the Ethiopian *Derg* in the course of several months if not weeks. The original purveyors of this ideological influence (junior Air Force officers

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who took evening classes at the Haile Selassie University) were later shot to death but the external Marxist influence has continued through other channels (dissemination of Soviet political literature, political education and training in East European countries, foreign advisers, and so on).

Although alien ideologies have a certain advantage over indigenous ideologies (their values are less likely to be suspected as being partial or advantageous to a narrow social, ethnic, or religious group), they also have drawbacks. The most important of them is a low adhesion to their proclaimed norms even among active members of the group or body propagating an alien ideology. Political results of a low adhesion are the artificial or even fictional character of an ideology, low stability of the political regime, political apathy, spread of corruption and nepotism, and more. Over the last three decades the failure/success ratio of the third world ideologies has been high and is likely to drop only slowly.

Far from witnessing "an end of ideologies," this century has been witnessing their flourishing and spread over the biggest part of the globe. This process will undoubtedly continue well into the next century. Ideologies are expected and called upon to perform a difficult and crucial job. Externally they are to secure in the world community a position of real equality for the third world states.

Irrespective of their great variety, the third world ideologies still perform the basic function of the third world: self-assertion. Usually this goal is stated in universalist terms and proclamations are made on the common cause and common destiny of the third world. Notwithstanding, the real unit of self-assertion is almost invariably the state. This is also true of ideologies championing suprastate causes. Despite claims and pretensions to the contrary, the ideology of the Baath "regional command" in Baghdad, for example, is in the service of the Iraqi state, and that of the "regional command" in Damascus is in the service of the Syrian state. The same applies to all successful Marxist ideologies in the third world.

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One of the best examples of a well-codified state ideology (of a Marxist variety) is *Kimilsungism,* the official ideology of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Its author, President Kim Il Sung, "national hero, genius of revolution and construction, leader of the world revolution, bright torch and standard-bearer of the struggle at the present time, the greatest genius of thought and theory in human history" (al Missuri, 1978: 15), is declared to be the heir to Marx and Lenin, but the heir who has surpassed his European predecessors.

The whole system of Kimilsungism is based on the great idea of *Juche,* presumably discovered by Kim "for the first time in the history of human thought" (al Missuri, 1978: 16-17). This "brilliant idea" is in its turn "based on a profound philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything." Having thus introduced strong elements of idealistic voluntarism, Kimilsungism has presumably "thoroughly overcome the historical limitations of the former revolutionary theories and evolved them onto a new higher stage." Instead of Marxism-Leninism, "philosophy centered on matter," Kimilsungism introduced a "philosophy centered on man, and thus wrought a radical change in the development of the revolutionary idea" (al Missuri, 1978: 33).

The self-assertive nature of Kimilsungism is strongly expressed on many levels. It serves Korea and the Korean revolution (Ajami, 1978: 43). It stresses a rigidly independent stand in international affairs, full political independence, complete equality and mutual respect among nations, full economic independence, self-reliance, self-defense, and self-protection (al Missuri, 1978: 28-29). Its major theme is "a sacred liberation struggle for hundreds of millions of oppressed and humiliated people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America" (al Missuri, 1978: 35). It also explicitly criticizes the limitations (biases) of European (and Europo-centrist) Marxism-Leninism as it "demolishes the established idea that regarded the working class movement in suzerains as the sole basic force of the revolution." "The great significance of the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism . . . finds expression in the fact that this theory has enabled the peoples of underdeveloped countries to win the cause of national liberation by

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extricating them from a flunkeyist viewpoint and enhancing their revolutionary zeal and initiative" (al Missuri, 1978: 35-36).

Internally ideologies are expected to buttress the attainment of international self-assertion (1) by achieving a greater internal cohesion and unity of the state and (2) by bringing prevailing social norms into line with the perceived needs of economic development and modernization. In extreme cases, third world ideologies are used to justify policies of forced assimilation, of supressing, expelling, and even physically destroying ethnic, religious, cultural, and other minorities in the name of the goal(s) of eliminating entire "parasitic" social and occupational groups, using forced labor on a mass scale in the name of the goal, in the Near East, East Africa, and South-East Asia.

Broadly speaking, during coming decades we can expect: (1) a growing complexity of the third world ideologies; (2) a higher degree of maturity and domesticity; and (3) a greater role played by worker ideologies.

Political emancipation of the third world has altered significantly the flows of ideological currents. From the role of imitator and importer of alien ideologies the third world has become *even* an exporter. These exports have gone mostly to the "first world" in these forms: religiously colored traditionalism and mysticism (Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic); defensive racism ("Black Muslims" and the proponents of "Negritude" among American blacks); left-wing Marxoid influences associated with the names of Fanon, Mao Ze-don, Ho Shi-min, and Guevarra.

This change in itself indicates a very significant shift in the world community. It foreshadows the coming age of true world integration, interpenetration, and interdependence in the realm of social and political ideas.

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